Military and Islamization in Pakistan from 1971 to 1999

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ABSTRACT

This article covers the use of Islam as a means of identification and as an integral part of the Pakistan Army Officer Corps' ideology between 1971 and 1999. Many officers have found their identity in the Army's interpretations of Islam. This article also vies that the Army has continually combined concepts of the disgraced 'Martial Race' theory and Islam as the foundation of the Army's superiority over other forces, most especially the Indian Army, since its inception. In historical context the British Indian Army remained indulge in political, religious and cultural activities and being the successor of British Indian Army, the Pakistan's Army did continue the practice. Beyond all else, the Military's devastating loss to India in 1971 influenced the formation of an Army culture centered on Islam. Islam was also divulged to have a long history of association with and conflation with concepts such as martial race and Muslim triumphalism, as well as warfighting enthusiasm, unit, and equipment designations.

Keywords: Army, Iman, Islamization, Pakistan, Religion, Taqwa, and Jihad-fi-sabeel-illah'

Introduction

When considering Pakistan's key role as an ally in the US-led "global war on terror" in the first and second decades of the 21st century, the history of Islam's impact on the Pakistan Army Officer Corps is especially important. Pakistan's help is especially vital in assisting a number of western countries that are members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in their efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and avert the Islamist Taliban regime from regaining power, which Pakistan previously supported. When viewed against controversial accusations of the Army's ongoing backing for Islamist militant Jihadis, an analysis of Islam's position in the Pakistan Army is both historical and contemporary (Esposito, 1999). Western reservations regarding the role of Islam in the Pakistan Army are not new, especially since the turn of the millennium, when questions about the nature of a "radicalized nuclear capable Pakistan Army" and an Islamist insurrection within the Army have dominated public discourse. All through history, the Army has aimed to encourage Islam externally to nations such as the United States in the early 1950s as an intrinsic element of the Army's pious anticommunist warrior mentality, which has made them great soldiers. Internally, the Army would legally establish Islam as the basis of a philosophy of warfare and ethics for the Army beyond the ken of a number of procedures introduced during the Zia Islamisation years throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. The nature of Islam's history in Pakistan's army and how the development of the army from 1947 have been impacted by its institutional heritage from the British Indian Army is therefore crucial to comprehend. Conceiving and interacting with Islam on racial and martial recruiting has led to the foundation and development of the Pakistan military's strategic culture.
The repercussions of the 1971 war and how the loss of war has been a ‘strategic shock’ to the Army which has called its leadership and ethos into question. In particular, there was a conviction that the loss of morality of the senior Officer Corps was to an extent ascribed to it. These officers were considered as irreligious and Slavic adherents of the British Indian Army’s hereditary ethos. Bhutto’s use of Islam to strengthen his domestic as well as international influence. Throughout an intensive moment of worldwide Islamic revival that included the Islamic revolution in Iran and situation emanating from the Soviet Army’s invasion of Afghanistan, Zia’s Islamisation programme for Pakistan included the Islamisation of the Army to fulfill his ambitions of a majestic Islamic alliance.

The Aftermaths of the 1971 War

The defeat in 1971 came as a complete bombshell to the people of West Pakistan, who had been made to assume that the Army would triumph. Masses burst forth in rage against Yahya Khan for dragging the nation to its knees and mislaying half of the country (Rahman, 2005, pp. 187–188). The tremor of losing the East was compounded by the two-day lull of hostilities in the West, especially because Yahya had declared that the war would continue. The crushing defeat by India became a national tragedy, grieved by West Pakistan’s population and army alike (Murphy, 1989, pp. 21–22).

The effect of downfall and incarceration on numerous prisoners of war jailed in India had also caused many Officers to have an epiphany. Many formerly skeptic Muslims became significantly more religious as a result of Major General Qureshi’s encounter with Pakistani inmates of war in Agra Jail (Qureshi, 2002, p. 211).

It is essential to figure out that the acuity of moral failure in the Army in the aftermath of loss, and more especially moral failure of the Army’s leadership, was severe. The war’s defeat had dealt a severe blow to the Army’s entire superstructure of confidence and dominance, and officers were eager to identify where the underlying fault in the Army lay.

Bhutto and Islamization

Bhutto grasped the power and influence available to anyone who could effectively woo the conservative Muslim power base in Pakistan as well as those overseas at a period of increasing Muslim awareness. Bhutto launched a variety of measures in attempt to position Pakistan as a leader in the Islamic world. Bhutto established himself as a leader of the Muslim world in 1974 by organizing the 1974 Islamic conference in Lahore. Bhutto made use of the opportunity to recognize Bangladesh so that Mujibur Rahman could attend the summit. Religious organizations like as the JI were still enraged by the loss of East Pakistan and were fiercely fervently to Bhutto’s recognition of Bangladesh and his invitation of the Maoist Mujibur Rahman to the conference (Khan, 2001, p. 140).

Bhutto had also foreseen the destabilizing impact of radical Islam on faltering secular regimes in the Muslim world. Bhutto aggressively promoted Islamism as a way of destabilizing Afghanistan, as well as its ongoing stabs to resurrect its Pukhtunistan claims against Pakistan. In this sense, Bhutto hoped to use Islam as a stumbling block to Afghanistan’s ongoing secularly inspired irredentism. Bhutto’s emphasis on the Islamic card, however, rekindled old biases. Officers observed that the increasing focus on Islam exacerbated biases against groups within the officer corps, such as Ahmadis. Bhutto’s increased focus on claimed Islamic purity resulted in Bhutto’s statement in 1974 that the Ahmadis were not Muslims. The statement created additional schisms in the Army and the departure of more skilled Officers, who happened to be Ahmadiya and found continuing duty in the Army unbearable (Haroon, 2008, p. 151).
On 17 April 1977, Bhutto moved to education as another area in which he took steps to demonstrate his Islamic beliefs by making the teaching of the Quran an obligatory topic in schools. As the religious right and opposition parties opposed his authority, Bhutto’s early ecstatic reputation as leader, based on his captivating characteristics, waned. During his final days in office, Bhutto ordered restrictions on consuming alcohol, horseracing, and the shutdown of casinos (Chishti, 1989, pp. 79 & 98). The media at the time saw Bhutto’s remarks as sops intended to weaken the religious right’s resistance. Bhutto implemented a number of policies that were widely perceived as clearly geared at maintaining power. Bhutto increased the salaries of the army, police, and civil service in order to preserve their support in the face of growing civil noncompliance against his authority (*The Economist*, Vol. 263, No. 6973, April 23, 1977, pp. 65-66).

The Pakistani ‘Shurafaa’ (middle class) were skeptical of Bhutto’s Islamic rhetoric. The Shurafaa were completely dissatisfied with Bhutto, whom they saw as basically an un-Islamic socialist, anti-middle class, and who had angered many with his nationalisation of industries, while his pretentiousness on Islam was contrary to Pakistani philosophy (Burki, 1988, p. 1087). Chief of Army Staff, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, proclaimed martial law in the middle of the civil disobedience. Military rule was established, elections were promised, and Pakistan’s third military dictator in thirty years took power for the following eleven years. Ironically, the General who deposed Bhutto was picked by Bhutto for his supposed tameness and readiness to implement Bhutto’s policies (COHEN, 2004, p. 139). It was blamed that Bhutto was involved in rigging in election held in 1977 and also involved in the murder of Nawab Muhammad Ahmed Khan. Charges were leveled against Bhutto and despite the worldwide appeals of his pardon Zia tried and executed him. As General was identified to be religious and to sympathize with the Shurafaa and the Jama’at-i Islami.

**Zia Islamization**

Though many agreed to Zia’s religiosity and modesty, others, such as Lieutenant General Chishti, remarked that he had to remain in office solely to preserve his personal life following Bhutto’s imprisonment (Talbot, 1998, pp. 246–248). Chishti did admit, however, that Zia was believed to be religious, but this had not given the senior Officer Corps any anxiety (Chishti, 1989, p. 140). The Soviet incursion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 would give Zia with much-needed legitimacy from the US, which was eager to feat and undermine the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. In offering such support, the US was able to overlook concerns such as Zia’s recent killing of Bhutto, his quest of nuclear capabilities, and his implementation of Islamic law. Western jurists, Amnesty International, and women all decried the penalty and evidentiary measures in Zia’s proclamation of Islamic law (Talbot, 2009, p. 250). The Shariyat (Hudood) laws and their mandated Hadd penalties of killing and mutilation captivated the curiosity of the West. Though some maintained that the harder parts of the these rules, such as the death sentence and decapitations, were hardly used, it is difficult to dispute that the deployment of a public hanging before a large audience for adultery was not barbaric regardless of how frequently it was administered (Lamb, 1991, p. 85). The Soviet incursion offered justification for a holy war. It formalized army support for covert and guerrilla combat as a legitimate type of combat, sponsored and furnished for by Saudi Arabia and the United States. The start of the war, as well as Pakistan’s frontline usefulness to the US, may have contributed to Zia’s survival (Muzaffar, et. al. 2017)

The rebellion against the Soviets enabled Zia to legitimize religious warfare. In his endorsement of a publication written on the topic during the era by a Pakistan Army Brigadier, Zia offered the stamp of endorsement for the application of particular Islamic injunctions pertaining to the conduct of war and the advocacy of what amounted to “total war.” (Malik, 2008)
In the beginning of General Zia’s period, the Officers of army failed to observe manifestations of political Islam emerging not just in Iran, but also throughout much of the Muslim world. Many officers in the Army have already expressed a desire for a wider involvement of Islam in the Army as a motivating and normative factor. Officers have been writing clearly since the late 1960s on reasons for a bigger role for Islam as well as the abolition of colonial practices. Zia, who was presumably fully conscious of the Iranian desire to remove the aristocratic attributes of the Iranian Army and all trace amounts of the Shah’s rule, may have regarded some of these advancements in the frame of reference of his own Islamisation scheme, as well as his dislike of the hereditary British Indian Army culture (Zabir, 2012, pp. 136–137). My trust in God and his teachings was able to keep me from following in the footsteps of the officers of the British Indian Cavalry and the Pakistan Armored Corps (Burki, 1988, p. 185). However, Zia’s technique of Islamizing the Army was much less drastic than what transpired throughout Iran’s Islamic revolution. Zia’s purges of the Army were not carried out by public execution, but by ignoring and discreetly removing less religious officers. Zia, on the other hand, imprisoned many of his opponents and, above all, killed Bhutto. Zia also imprisoned officers found accused of conspiring to assassinate him or committing other serious offenses. For example, after disposing of Zia and the high command, Major General Tajammal Hussein Malik wanted to build the Islamic fundamentalist state based on the Khulaaafa-i-Rasidin mode (Cyril Glasse, pp. 84–85.). The aim is to locate and detain dissenting military officers. Galaxy Operation was established. A number of officers were arrested and caged for planning Zia, whom he called ‘the waging war against Pakistan (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 15–18)”.

Zia implemented an Islamization plan for Pakistan and the Pakistan Army with the goal of redressing colonial legacies from the British era. Zia aimed to instill a more real Pakistani and Islamic culture across the country, as well as in the Army and all other governmental institutions. Zia also thought that Pakistanis want Islamization, and he attempted to bring both Islamization and a return to some indigenous Pakistani practices, some of which were as basic as a return to indigenous dress. To accelerate Islamization, Zia proposed reforms in a variety of cultural and educational sectors, including the rewriting of school textbooks and the replacement of English language instruction in English medium schools with Urdu. A new reform of the economy to abolish moneylending and to integrate Islamic teaching within the economy, which would deepen Islamist factional divisions between the Sunni and Shias in Pakistan, also formed part of Zia’s Islamic policy. During the period of Zia there emerged more conflicts regarding religion as when Zia decided to impose Zakat laws on Shia community this earned the opposition of Shia community and when after the demands of Shia Zia left the restrictions on Shia regarding Zakat it earned the wrath of Sunnies. So his policies made more fractions in Pakistan. Zia’s law-tinkering had aggravated the disparities between both the literalistic Deobandis and the more syncretic folk in Pakistan, Barelvis thought of the two prominent streams of Sunni Muslims (I. Malik, 1996, pp. 158–159). Zia has also made changes to radio subject matter and television to promote positive thinking about the state and the task of Islamisation. During his visit to Pakistan under Zia’s rule, V.S. Naipaul made the argument that Zia’s Islamisation program had redefined Pakistan’s role and history. Naipaul stated that Zia’s Muslims involved manufacturing Pakistan’s historical identity with Zia now trying to suggest that Pakistanis be a progeny of Islamic conquerors and Turkish, Arab or Mughal conquerors of subcontinent (Naipaul, 1981, pp. 134–135). According to Naipal, Zia in the process of reconstruction of the history, Zia neglected some important facts of the history of Islam in South Asia. Naipal criticized on his reconstruction policy because of the neglected elements of history of Muslims in South Asian territory.

Like the findings made by Naipaul, others who visited Pakistan during Zia’s time recognized the martial and ethnic identity divergences. Not only Muslim, but also Non-Muslim, but Pakhtun and Punjabi differed substantially. There were Pakhtun views that
criticized Punjabi martial identity and were re-emphasized by the martial race spoken by the arch-martial race. During Zia’s period the statements on Islamisation, native characteristics and government policies had occasionally become so inexhaustible, puzzling and self-contradictory that the abbreviation for Zia’s designation of ‘Chief Martial Law Administrator’ (CMLA) was in its place stated to as ‘cancel my last announcement’.

As a subject taught in Pakistani training institutes, Zia established the 'holy war' philosophy, and the 1978 manual of Pakistan Army Officers clearly made this commitment plain, with his exhortation.

Various people in the army probably still outraged by the loss of the 1971 war welcomed Zia’s Islamisation drive. Officers holding such a view claimed that Zia finally “justified” and that the Zia system rectified 30 years of poor enculturation. Even Zia’s proclamation of the new Islamic slogan for the Army in 1976 of ‘Iman, Taqwa, and Jihad-fisabeel-ilah’ was believed to be the first pattern of an Islamic slogan agreed to Pakistan’s ethnic needs and cultural likings.

In its 1978 publication and circulation of the leaflet entitled General Staff Publication 10260, Akhlaqiat, which seeks provide the officials with the doctrinal foundation of Islamic leadership, Zia inculcated the Army by introducing Islamic leadership philosophies and the ethics. The motivation anthology of Qur’anic verses was promoted in Urdu as a further booklet titled Eene-Sarfaroshi, an English approximation called ‘The Constitution of Valour,’ with English translations concerning soldiers and soldiering (Naqvi & Hussain, 1990, pp. 18–19). While these improvements were to a certain degree exterior trappings, they made an honest effort to Islamize the army for many officers.

Other sightseers to Pakistan remarked on his Islamization. During a visit to the fundamentalist Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania seminary, Professor Ziauddin Sardar remarked that its administrator, Maulana Samiul Haq, who was thought to have influenced Zia, stated that several seminary degree holders had been recruited in the Army (Sardar, 2005, pp. 222–224). The inclusion of ‘outward expressions of Islamic piety such as beard allowances’ was also part of Zia’s Islamisation of the Army. Zia also intentionally targeted Officer recruiting on lower middle-class Shurafaa who were conservative and religious, as well as rewarded Officers with an Islamist inclination while neglecting liberal or even less religiously oriented Officers, many of whom retired as a result of their denial (Tomsen, 2013, p. 244). Officers also performed responsibilities in Saudi Arabia, which was crucial for Zia. The Saudi alliance was crucial to Zia because he considered it offered some credibility for Pakistan’s Islamic credentials as well as a psychological move towards its Islamic heritage. For some Officers, the prospect to be sent to Saudi Arabia, the Islamic holy country, and the more fundamentalist version of Islam was appealing. Those who are aware with Pakistan’s Deoband style of Islam may have been inspired by the more strict Saudi traditions, while those who are more associated with the more syncretic and folk Barelvi may have been inspired by the more strict Saudi customs (Staudenmaier & Tahir-Kheli, 1981).

Although not all Officers backed Zia’s Islamization, his ongoing dominance over the country and command of the Army meant that any Officer expressing severe dissatisfaction would, at the very least, have a shorter Army career. A lot of the elder generation of partition officers believed that Zia’s long stint in power had harmed the Army’s professionalism by diverting resources to non-military tasks such as manning government institutions.


Unlike his two earlier Army successors who governed Pakistan, Ayub and Yahya Khan, Zia was in command of the Army and Pakistan at the time his term was abruptly cut short. Zia’s legacies of Islamising Pakistan and the Army succeeded to systematically infuse
many Army officers with an Islamist temperament that was obvious even after his death between 1988 and 1999. The examination in this article shows that officers regarded the role of Islam from a variety of views, ranging from Islamist to more secular and professional. Regardless of Officers' personal sentiments about faith, Islam remained the basis of a successful around which the Army's strategic culture was built. The Army remained convinced in 1988, as it would in 1999 and as it had in 1947, that a Hindu India sought to eliminate Pakistan due to its Islamic identity. As a result, Pakistan's strategic culture remained one in which conceptions of 'Islam in peril' retained their vitality and relevance inside the Officer Corps.

In a sudden plan crash, the president and COAS Zia Ul Haq died on 17th of August 1988 along with his close generals and a US ambassador as well. The vacuum of president was filled by Ghulam Hussain Khan the then Chairman senate and the vacuum of COAS was filled by General Mirza Aslam Beig. They (president with the support of COAS) announced the elections in the state and decided to hand over the powers to civilians. The PPP under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto welcomed the announcement. To counter the PPP and alliance was made by General Hameed Gul with the support of COAS and President by the name of Islami Jamhori Ittehad (IJI). This was the coalition of 8 right wing parties. But despite the efforts of establishment, the PPP won the elections. But this government could not complete its constitutional term of five years and was dissolved by the president. in the next elections held in 1990, the IJI won the elections with clear majority and blue eye of establishment Nawaz Sharif became the PM and having a coalition of rightest parties a shariat Bill was passed by the assembly which disputably clarified that the Islamist leitmotifs of the erstwhile Zia era were being pursued by his civil tyro Sharif.

Generals and Islam

The appointment of General Mirza Aslam Beg as COAS was a big change as he was the first COAS who got commissioned in army after the independence of Pakistan(Nawaz, 2008, pp. 416–417). Beg, on the other hand, was Zia's offspring, and he did not bring in any significant doctrinal change inside the Army during his term, instead continuing to preach Zia's Islamisation. Beg's term was notable for his incendiary Islamist remarks that ran counter to the government's stated goals. As during Gulf War, Beg made public remarks in favour of Saddam Hussein. Beg characterized the US and Western military operation against Saddam as a Western-Zionist strategy to neutralize the Muslim world. Beg's comments were very similar to those of the JI, an Islamic extremist party(Karamat, et. al. 2019; Haqqani, 2005). Many in the Army and in Pakistan saw Beg's remarks favorably, believing Saddam to be the alleged victim in the fight, to be commended for his resistance of the US-led coalition that had invaded a fellow Muslim nation(Cloughley, 2008).

In spite of Beig's claims, the Pakistan Army did participate in the Gulf War, but with the understanding that they would be solely a security force to defend the sacred sites in Saudi Arabia. This was in contrast to other Muslim coalition members, such as Saudi Arabia, which did join in battle against the Iraqis and supported US led forces(Cloughley, 2008). Beig and other senior Generals were undoubtedly part of a powerful chain of those who had been Islamized during the era of Zia.

Christina Lamb, Bhutto's friend, stated in 1989 that Zia had indoctrinated the Army with Islamism and effectively created a significant Islamist section in the High Command(Lamb, 1991, p. 79). Cloughley, a former defence attaché in Pakistan, expressed reservations about the snowballing influence of Zia's Islamization of the Army and the religious party's preaching operations on the Army's officer corps(Cloughley, 2008).

In her first tenure as Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto said Beg's Islamist goals for the Army were extravagant and aggressive in their intention. Beg was accused of proposing a
plan to launch a pre-emptive strike against India in order to recapture Kashmir with the help of the Army's Islamist friends from Afghanistan (Bhutto, 2007, pp. 406 & 423). Beg's "grandness" was on display at the Army's war drills in 1989. The war exercises, dubbed Operation 'Zarb-e-Momin' (Strike of the True Believer) and staged near India's Rajasthan desert, were the largest ever held by the Army (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 420–421). In other respects, Beg's Islast tendencies were obvious, such as his removing of Officers' religious inclinations from their annual confidential reports, which basically gave Officers more leeway from potential penalty in their religious connections.

Tomsen, the US envoy to the Mujahidin between 1989 and 1992, shared Bhutto's objections and concerns about Gul's "messianic Islamist ideology" and grip on several top officers (Tomsen, 2013, pp. 255–257). The CIA accused Gul of aggressive 'Jihadism,' believing him to be the mastermind of aggressive cross-border Islamist assaults in the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The Russians also thought that Pakistanis were transferring Islamic terrorism to Chechnya and other Soviet central Asian countries, which was being managed at ISI and Army training centers in Pakistan (I. Khan, 2001, p. 26).

Instead of this desire that Beg tried his best to get extension as COAS he was replaced by General Asif Nawaz, a secularist. Nawaz, unlike Beg, tried to minimize the focus on religion's role in the Army, despite the fact that top Islamist commanders had a tendency to operate beyond the jurisdiction of his command. Nawaz had just dismissed an 'Islamist Corps Commander' who had staged an illegal raid that resulted in severe deaths during Beg's term in 1990 (Nawaz, 2008). General Abdul Waheed Kakar replaced Asif Nawaz.

With the uncovering of another Islamist coup attempt during General Waheed's term in 1995, the existence and entrenched nature of radical Islamist elements in the Army became clear. The plot was dubbed the 'Khilafat' intrigue since the purported goal of the coup was to brutally remove the government and create Nizam-e-Mustafa, an ambition that the JI also desired, although peacefully (Mahmood, 1995, p. 288). Over forty Army officers, including Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbassi, Brigadier Mustansur Billan, and Colonel Azad Minhas, as well as thirty-eight others, were accused of plotting to assassinate the country's political and military leadership. As they were aiming to eliminate the top political and military leadership from the scene to launch their own agenda.

The aim of the coup leaders was the declaration of an Islamic revolution and a dissolution in a caliphate vision of the frontiers between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Bhutto, 2007). While they rejected the conspiracy and said that the charges were politically driven, Bhutto and the foreign militant at the time believed that they were real (Cloughley, 2008, p. 79). The attack strongly highlighted the goals of an important Islamic factor in the army that was not interested in the army's lukewarm Islam indoctrination. These officers wanted to initiate an Islamic revolution in its entirety that would radically alter the state and army. These officers constituted a split in the army between the Muslim components of liberal and moderate disposition and the fundamentalist parts of Islam. These extreme military officers were willing to achieve a vision much beyond Zia's Islamisation programme of the 1980s with violence.

It was obvious that at this era a number of officers wished for the army and country a new Islamic command, and were disappointed by the gradual or symbolic changes in Islam. This coup attempt was perhaps the indication that Islamism is now mature with its effect on the following generation of officers. The Islamist movement was nourished during the Zia years.

Waheed Kakar was followed/replaced by General Jehangir Karamat who, because of conflicts with Prime Minister Sharif, took shadow at his public remarks concerning national security, would depart his term. Musharraf, in turn, was embroiled in a dispute with Sharif
over the unsuccessful Kargil campaign, substituted Karamat. The Musharraf-Sharif rivalry had led Sharif to try to remove Musharraf, who in turn drove Sharif in a coup in October 1999. Throughout this period, a considerable number of former military officers participated in religious groups and political parties in government. There were also numbers of Zia’s protegeen PML Nawaz Sharif and the more evidently Islamic parties while a few were present in the more secular PPP. Nawaz Sharif had four military officer in his party, including Gohar Ayub Khan, the son of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. A lot of other former Colonel-to-Brigadier rank officers in the party. The Bhutto led PPP, which had a considerable number of retracted army officials in its ranks, including General Naseerullah Babar, who were protesting the martial law regimes of Ayub and Zia. Babar was an architect in Afghanistan in the early 1970s for an Islamic uprising which inspired Bhutto as a way to cripple Pakistan’s irredentist objectives. Babar had also collaborated military and intelligence services vs a suspected MQM plot to separate and rename Karachi ‘Jinnahpur.’

The Secretary of the Islamist Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, which includes retired Army officials and retired Majors and Captains, was originally commissioned by Major General Azhar, an army officer in the UK Indian Armed Forces, while the Islamist Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).

In 1980, Major General Tajammal Hussain had been a former Muslim army officer to topple and assassinate Zia, along other retired military officers who were Islamists. Malik created the Qaumi Riffah Party, with former senior officers like Major-General Ameer Hamza and Sheren Dil Khan as well as other Major to Brigadier officers.

Together with evidence of substantial Islamist groups in the military, some extremist, evidence indicates the infiltration in the military by others of Islam's devotions to retired officers in a proclamation of fundamentalist political parties.

The commander of army Staff College stated that a shift in the leadership culture of the Pakistan Army was necessary and what he said was the perpetuation of an imperialist pattern of British leadership. During the 1990ies, a number of officers argued that they had the cultural description of the profane 'God' image of the perfect incorruptible British Officer. Officers argued that they had inherited Britain's management approach to foster a faultless officer who tried blasphemously to develop mawkishness and fidelity towards the regiment instead of Islam. In fact, the British tried to build dedication to the troop and took special care to foster religious identity and cultural practices within the troops (Roy, 2009).

Many officers realized in the 1990s that previous attempts at Islamizing the military were insincere (Mahmood, 1995). Officers expressed unease about the use of the Islamic motto 'Iman' by the Armed Forces, 'Taqwa,' 'Jehad Fi Sabillah' as a slogan by many, rather than an aspect of the path to martial superiority. Officers who insisted that only the return to such Islamic authenticity and the removal of foreign accretions would fulfill their potential were pursued distinctly fundamentalist issues during this time. Officers.

Despite concerns over the deleterrent effects of radicalisation, the dispute continued to create a martial literary works portraying Jihad and the outstanding Muslim soldier on the control line in Kashmir valley, as well as Siachen Glacier and Kargil. Like prior Islamist works, such as the Qur’anic Warfare fundamental idea by Brigadier Malik, which praised the qualities of the Pakistani soldiers as a courageous Ghazi and Shahheed, A new generation of Islamist literary works approved by the army was present at the start of the decade to receive a stamp of approval of COAS (S. K. Malik, 2008).

Similarly, the 1991 Book of Muslim Motivation and National Defense by Brigadier Inamul Haq was drafted in the established pattern of preserving the supremacy of the Pakistani Muslim military man while promoting Islamic coercion and war.
Islamic ideology was never seen as a magic bullet for all officers to encourage and fight efficacy, as many of them were still worried about the future of military leadership if the concentrate on Islam was lopsided. A number of officers in the 1990s have denied Islamization preference. The more liberal lens of education systems and vocational training have shown problems in terms of optimization and productivity.

During this time many officers did not consider Islam and piousness to be the prime attributes needed to manage or enhance the overall performance and efficiency of the Army. These officers as Muslims naturally considered the faith of their Officer Corps to be a strong moral quality. They did not see it as the central objective for improving the Officer Corps’ key expertise, as many of the teaching system are seen as a major occupational problem. Foreign military attachés also noticed problems with military and Pakistani standards of education in general. In case of increase to 450,000 in the military during the Zia period and the negative impact of the Zia policy on the opening of 'urdu medium schools' the PMA was to lower its entry benchmark and its quality as teachers during the period (Cloughley, 2002).

Others contended that religion was practiced more for show than for spiritual practice, and that the Army should focus purely on improving the quality and quantity of secular education provided to the Officer Corps. Many senior officers in the 1990s believed that if the Army did not address these flaws in professional military education by focusing less on Islamic indoctrination, the Army would face truly catastrophic issues such as an increased risk of inner factionalism. Although these Officers did not state that clearly, their assertion in part might have meant that Islam was rejected as a way of filling an unprofessional and secular education training gap.

Although many didn't see Islam as the Army's main occupational problem, they recognized its importance as a motivating force for the Army. As was the case for previous generations of officers, during the 1990s, officers looking for a balanced model of religion and professional training argued the balance model that the defense force of Israel seemed to have achieved.

Gen. Jehangir Karmat saw Islamization in a clever analysis of Pakistan's evolving demographic, political and religious consciences and the men that the officer corps had recruited. The argument of Karamat somehow reflects the same arguments put forward in the seventeenth century by the British parliamentarians to insist that the British military also reflect the changes taking place in English society (Rosen, 1995, p. 16). Lieutenant General Karamat argues in this way that the army should not adopt a doctrinaire approach to Islam, but rather should focus on analyzing Pakistani society’s evolved socio-religious contours. He opined that officer had to adjust their leadership in such a way that they could genuinely resonate with their men, and it was vital for an officer to understand Pakistan in this respect the contemporaneous importance of Islam. It was believed that Islamization would take place without a violent uprising, despite the existence of militant Islamic sectarian groups. Islamization was thought to become an unstoppable tidal wave which avoids the need for force and coercion.

General Karamat’s statement was based on the premise that religion had become the "sine qua non" of Pakistani society, and thus it was not necessarily a risk if the Army aligned itself with dominant societal mores rather than resisting them, which would result in a major backlash. Importantly, Karamat, who was to become COAS in 1996, acknowledged, as previously stated, that the Officer Corps in the 1990s was made up of religiously conservative Shurafa middle-class men. It would be unnecessary for Karamat to have those officers placed by the military or forced into positions that are incompatible with the prevailing Islamic society and its beliefs.
Karamat’s anecdotes on the Officer Corps’ religiously conservative origins were a feature that had been building up since the late 1960s. Officers from the professional urban middle and lower classes had been joining the Army in large numbers since the late 1960s, owing to the increasingly important role of specialized services in the education, medical, and engineering corps; a group similar in origin to those young men who had also joined religious parties (Akhtar, 1989, p. 623).

The military was strategically attentive to the dangers of adherence to the hereditary foreign traditions immediately following the loss of the Army during the War of 1971.

Karamat was probably aware of the lessons learned in 1971, after being served by the 1971 'strategic shock’ of the war. The public outcry against Yahya Khan and his coterie of officers, Karamat knew that they had been isolated from Pakistani society’s religious tenor and from perceived notion of their non-Islamic practices. Officers such as Karamat thought that the Officer Corps’ Islamisation had to have a socially and culturally relevant form that was sensitive to secular affiliation to deal with extremism germs.

In the late 1990’s, Officers growingly predicted the dangers to Pakistan coming from Pakistan itself and factional groups are willing, even with the army and ISI’s supposed control and influence of most of these groups, to engage in violence in Pakistani cities. Some saw the growth of sectarian violence as an instrument for peace brokering with India, while Pakistan purified itself. The role of military, therefore, on specific pattern and the methods adopted for implementation in different eras of rulership. Ideology, however, has a greater role to play most prominently the Islamic ideology which never seen as a magic bullet to encourage, inspire or fight efficacy, as many of them were still apprehensive about the future of military leadership if the concentrate on Islam was disproportionate.
References


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